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Abstract
This paper aims to examine the effects of dividends, types of ownership structure
and board governance on Malaysian firm’s value using sample of 406 listed
firms on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia. A cross-sectional analysis for the
years 2002 and 2005 was utilised. Both direct effects as well as the moderating
effects of board governance with dividends and types of ownership structure
are examined. The moderating relationship is considered in order to investigate
the board governance role after the implementation of the Malaysian Code of
Corporate Governance through the amendments of Bursa Malaysia Listing
Requirements in 2001. Result from the direct effect reveals that dividend has
a significant positive effect to firm value in both years, thus supporting the
expected hypothesis. This finding is consistent with the view that dividends
mitigate agency costs of free cash flow problem, therefore, increase firm value.
The finding also suggests that dividends among Malaysian listed firms can
play its important monitoring role in reducing agency costs. However, contrary
to expectation, government ownership indicates significantly positive
relationship. Correspondingly, the result implies that investors in the
Malaysian market do value the higher standards of corporate governance
reform found in the government-controlled firms. In addition, foreign
ownership has a negative significant relationship to firm value which is also
contrary to what is expected. Surprisingly, results on ownership concentration
and managerial ownership provide insignificant effect to firm value for both
years. Of particular interests are the results of moderating effects, the result
reveals that board duality has significantly moderated the relationship between
dividends and firm value with a lower coefficient positive effect as expected.
Thus, support the expected hypothesis. As expected, the result from the
moderating effect of board duality with government ownership in year 2002
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provided negatively significant result. However, both results of board duality with
dividends and government ownership provide insignificant effect for the year 2005.
Further, the interaction term between dividends with board independence was positively
significant for the year 2005. Whereas, the interaction term between dividends and
board size showed significantly lower coefficient positive moderating effect for both
years. Finally, the inclusion of board size interaction term to foreign ownership provided
significantly negative moderating effect in year 2002. Overall, findings from this paper
reveal that good board governance; particularly board independence and board size
can enhance the monitoring role of dividends, government, and foreign ownership in
reducing agency costs, thus increasing firm value.
Keywords: board governance; dividends; moderating effects; ownership structure
Introduction
Effective corporate governance has emerged as an issue of global significance. The
events of high profile corporate collapses1 of late and East Asian financial crisis in late
1997 have illustrated the failure of corporate governance systems internationally.
Corporate scandals have also been reported in Malaysia, such as Perwaja Steel, Malaysia
Airline, Technology Resources Industries, Sime Darby and Bumiputra Malaysia Finance
(Rashidah, 2006).
In response to these corporate failures, considerable research has been devoted in recent
years to the role of corporate governance and the ways in which corporate managers are
monitored by their shareholders. Most of this research has focused on countries with the
most highly developed economies, notably the U.S., U.K., Japan, and Germany. But it is
also important to develop a better understanding of corporate finance and governance in
emerging markets, particularly in Malaysia.
The survey articles of the literature2 on corporate governance have often cited that poor
corporate governance is one of the major contributing factors to the build-up of
corporations’ vulnerabilities that finally lead to the corporate failures, financial scandals
or economic crisis. Consequently, many countries are forced to consider corporate
governance issues at the forefront of the nation’s agenda for corporate and economic
policy. Corporate governance guidelines that are directed towards a better corporate
governance system have been established to prevent corporations from misusing
shareholder funds through questionable practices.
In an effort to restore investor confidence, governments around the world have
implemented a variety of regulatory and policy changes designed to strengthen corporate
governance aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability in corporate dealings.
Those actions are taken in order to reassure investors that there would be improvements
in the way corporations are managed and regulated3.
Effective good4 governance mechanisms matters for several reasons; it improves standards
in business, it encourages foreign investment and in macro-economic terms, it leads to
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improved performance by companies (Arden, 2003). For emerging market countries, good
corporate governance reduces emerging market vulnerability to financial crisis, reduces
transaction costs and the cost of capital, and leads to capital market development [Report
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) 2005].
With regard to the separation of ownership and control issue in corporate governance
research, there are numerous opinions discussed, which is dominantly by reference
called agency theory. The agency theory identifies potential conflicting interests among
parties within a company, which in turn affect corporate behaviour in different ways
(Jensen and Warner, 1988). Conflicts of interest between various parties are caused by
the differences in objectives of each party, based on their positions and interests in the
company. However, identifying which party has the dominant conflict with shareholders
is of importance to determine the nature of the agency problems. As argued by Jensen
and Warner (1988), ownership structure determines the nature of agency problems and
the distribution of power and control within an organisation. The separation of ownership
and control also has increased power of managers in a widely held firm (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983b). In effect, managers of a publicly held firm
could allocate resources to activities that benefit them, but are not in the shareholders’
best interest. In other words, managers (agents) may conduct actions that are costly to
shareholders, such as consuming excessive perquisites or over-investing in managerially
rewarding but unprofitable activities.
In sum, the central issue to any discussion of corporate governance research is the
question of how well each of governance mechanisms mitigates the various principal/
agent problems that arise in a firm. Moreover, lessons from corporate failures or collapses
also highlight the importance of a strong, independent and informed board that is capable
of evaluating management performance (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Given that
managers can make decisions to benefit their self-interest to the detriment of the principals
(i.e., shareholders), efficient board governance role is needed; not only to safeguard
shareholders’ interest but also to control management’s decision making processes and
actions. This realization partly explains why board governance is an important issue in
corporate governance.
In the case of emerging market such as Malaysia, it has been argued in a growing literature
that concentrated ownership structure or group affiliations are prone to carry inefficient
investment and generate minority shareholder expropriation5 (see for instance, La Porta et
al. 2002; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Denis and McConnell, 2003). In some cases, large
controlling shareholders are alleged to have expropriated corporate wealth to the detriment
of the corporations, minority shareholders and creditors (Lemmon and Lins, 2003). In
short, expropriation by inside shareholders is a more relevant issue in emerging countries
where the legal protection of minority shareholders is relatively low (La Porta et al. 2000a;
2000b). This particular case happened when the controlling shareholders exercise controls
through complex mechanisms such as pyramid structures or cross holdings. The
consequences of controlling shareholders expropriation include highly ownership
concentration (Faccio and Lang, 2000), lower dividend payments (La Porta et al. 2000a;
Faccio et al. 2001) and lower firm valuation (La Porta et al. 2002; Claessens et al. 2000b).
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Most prior studies have focused on monitoring and control mechanisms of ownership
structure and the board governance role to improve firm valuation. However, still relatively
few studies have addressed the control function of dividends as an alternative
governance mechanism to reduce the agency costs. As suggested by Jensen (1986),
dividends can help reduce the probability of incurring agency costs related to free cash
flow. Jensen (1986) views dividends as a control mechanism to help reduces managerial
discretionary behaviour. In this regard, dividends can be part of the firm’s optimal
monitoring device to curb potential agency conflicts, thus limiting agency costs (Rozeff,
1982). Therefore, dividends also can play an important role to enhance firm value as well
as other governance mechanisms, i.e. ownership structure and board governance.
Good corporate governance reform at work can facilitate external financing of firms, force
dividend payments and improve the efficiency of investment allocation (La Porta et al.
2000b). In line with that, Malaysia has implemented the reform of corporate governance
in the form of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2001 (MCCG 2001 hereafter),
through the amendments of regulations (i.e, the revamp of Listing Requirements of
Bursa Malaysia and securities law amendments), institutional reforms [(i.e., the
establishment of Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG)] as well as the
introduction of relevant industry best practices. In Malaysia, regulators take a multi-
pronged approach, with measures designed to strengthen the role of the board of
directors, enhance disclosure and transparency and improve shareholders’ rights (Boo,
2003). However, corporate governance still continues to be the major challenges in
emerging market, in such that the standards are still far behind from developed countries
(CLSA-ACGA, 2005).
The main purpose of this paper is, therefore, to examine the relationship between dividends
and ownership structure on firm value, and to identify the differential effects that board
governance impose to this relationship. This paper contributes by investigating the
effects of dividends and ownership structure on firm value, also by including the moderating
effects of board governance. The findings drawn from this paper are of interest to
researchers, investors and regulators as they demonstrate the effectiveness of board
governance as a moderator on the relationship between dividends and ownership structure
on firm value in Malaysian post-reform corporate governance era.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior relevant literature
and hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 and 4 describe the variables, methodology and
sample. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses
the implications.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
Dividends6
Dividend is a well known cash disbursement strategy for public listed that seeks to return
cash or assets to their shareholders. The distribution of excess cash to shareholders
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constitutes the most fundamental device that alleviates conflicts between corporate
insiders and outside shareholders (Jensen, 1986). However, firms can also return their
cash to shareholders in the form of share repurchases, where certain amount of cash is
used to buy back outstanding shares in the firm and reduce the number of shares
outstanding.
Regular distributions of funds to shareholders force firms with value-enhancing investment
projects to raise capital externally (Easterbrook, 1984). Consequently, firms are regularly
forced to undergo the scrutiny of the market, that is, the providers of external funds. The
commitment to pay out excessive funds to shareholders reduces the amount of free cash
flows that managers could otherwise spend on value-reducing projects (Jensen, 1986).
Jensen (1986) views dividends as a device to extract free-cash-flow (FCF) from the control
of managers that pursue non-value-maximizing objectives, for example, empire building. It
also can be argued in the context of agency costs of free cash flow argument that any form
of distribution of excess cash to shareholders would reduce the agency problem between
shareholders and managers. An important implication for this argument is that cash
distribution through dividends could have a positive impact on firm value because it
reduces the over-investment problem. La Porta et al. (1998) have argued that dividend
policy is the result of the pressure exercised by minority shareholders in order to force
insiders to pay cash. On the one hand, La Porta et al. (2002) state that firms located in
countries with a higher legal protection to minority shareholders pay higher dividends, as
compared to countries where legal protection is weak.
Types of Ownership Structure
The institutional environment in Malaysia, as it pertains to ownership structure, is
quite similar among East Asian countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and
Korea. Recent studies have shown that corporate ownership structure has a significant
effect on a firm’s payout policy (e.g.: Kumar, 2003; Wei et al. 2003; Skjeltorp and
Odegaard, 2004; Khan 2006). The importance of ownership structure in determining
the incentives of controlling shareholders to protect their own interests at the expense
of the minority shareholders during the East Asian crisis is also highlighted in few
prior studies (e.g.: Mitton, 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003). In this regard, they emphasise
the need for a proper design of corporate governance features that can protect the
rights of minority shareholders in emerging economies. Also, the role of ownership
structure varies over time periods and countries as a function of the legal system
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al. 2000a, 2000b, 2002). Several types of
ownership structure are discussed in this paper.
First, recent research emphasises that highly concentrated firms give rise to conflict of
interest between corporate insiders (controlling shareholders and managers) and outside
investors (minority shareholders).7 The incidence of concentrated shareholdings (even
as measured by the shareholdings of the largest shareholder) is very pronounced in
Malaysia, as compared to the incidence of dispersed shareholding which is uncommon
(ROSC 2005). Large share ownership provides the incentive for controlling shareholders
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to use their influence to maximize value, exert control and to protect their interest in the
company. It is well known that control rights attached to holding a large block of shares
attract a premium. This premium is usually associated with private benefits of control, i.e.
including investments in unrelated activities, whether for diversification or for the purpose
of empire building, the ability to extract rents at the expense of other minority shareholders
(La Porta et al. 2000a; Bena and Hanousek, 2006). This will then be reflected in the failures
of large investors to force their managers or companies to maximize profits and pay out
the profits in the form of dividends (ROSC, 2005).
Second, owner-managed ownership is also common among public listed companies in
Malaysia. As mentioned by Claessens et al. (2000a), at the 20% cut-off of control right,
about 85 per cent of Malaysian listed companies have owner managers. Managerial
ownership can help reduce agency costs because a manager who owns a large fraction
of the company’s shares bears the consequences and benefits of managerial actions
that destroy and create value for the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When managers
own a smaller portion of company shares, they have greater incentives to pursue personal
benefits and less incentive to maximize firm value. In this instance, one way to reduce the
associated increase in agency costs is with the increased shares hold by the managers.
The benefits of managerial ownership in ownership structure are highlighted under the
convergence-of-interest hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Third, government-controlled institutions also hold significant shares in Malaysian listed
companies. As at December 2000, government-controlled institutions retained about
49.5 per cent shares in listed companies [Eighth Malaysian Plan (EMP) 2001]. Large
government share ownership may be related to national interest and security reasons, as
reflected in the dominance of government ownership in companies operating in the
telecommunications, power and transportation sectors. Government industrial policy
favored by certain industries by citing public interest (e.g.: automobiles,
telecommunication, power etc.). Politically and equitable distribution of corporate wealth
is a key element in national development policy. These considerations have shaped the
structure of government ownership of the corporate sectors in Malaysia. Some of the
government-controlled institutions also hold shares in unit trust for the benefit of millions
of households, as part of the policy objective of allowing indigenous people to participate
in the economic growth of the country. Therefore, the motivation for government
ownership includes social objectives apart from profit maximisation. Additionally, large
companies in Malaysia also appear to be closely connected to influential political figures
(Nazli and Weetman, 2006). Their political linkages influence the accumulation and
concentration of wealth in Malaysian business (Gomez and Jomo, 2002, cited in Nazli
and Weetman, 2006).
Last, foreign institutional investors are also essential in Malaysia, as their level of share
ownership is quite significant (Boo, 2003). In general, foreign investors hold a significant
stake of shares or even a majority of shares as part of strategic investment. Multinational
companies also hold significant shareholdings in their subsidiaries listed on the Bursa
Malaysia. In a recent report on the observance of standards and codes of corporate
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governance (ROSC, 2005), it is reported that foreign-controlled companies in Malaysia
have been paying out a high proportion of their profits in the form of dividends (and not
reinvesting the profits in diversification or empire building activities). Moreover, foreign
institutional investors through their share ownership, can also provide capital, managerial
expertise and also exert monitoring activities on managers. As a consequence, foreign
ownership in emerging countries can improve corporate governance and enhance
efficiency.
Board Governance
The effectiveness of board governance has been the focus of much empirical research,
for instance, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) provided a survey of the empirical literature
on corporate boards. The boards of directors are elected by and to act on behalf of
shareholders. Besides their primary control responsibilities such as hiring, setting
compensation for, and monitoring top managers, they also help to provide strategic
advice and to obtain legitimacy and resources (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Hillman
and Daziel, 2003). With recent corporate collapses and the ensuing regulatory reforms in
many countries, the board governance landscape has changed dramatically during the
past few years. A firm’s corporate governance primarily consists of major mechanisms
such as board of directors and ownership structure (Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1993; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997).
This paper focuses attention on three aspects of board governance, namely, board
duality (separation of the board chairman and CEO roles), board independence, and
board size.
Board Governance Explanation
Board Chairman and the Separation of the Board chairman and CEO and the fraction
Chief Executive Officer of independent Board members have gained prominence in discussions
(CEO) Duality regarding improving corporate governance practices (Perry, 1995).
The role of the Board chairman and the chief executive officer are
distinct but supportive of each other. The board chairman is entrusted
with the responsibility for proper working of the board and ensuring
that all Board members are enabled to play full part in board functions.
The Chairman together with Board members is responsible for
monitoring and evaluating the performance of the CEO and his
management team. The CEO and the management team are ultimately
responsible for the day-to-day operations, to develop (with the
approval of the Board) and implement strategies for the success and
growth of the company. Combining the roles in one individual
concentrates power and creates conflict of interest. The separation of
the Board Chairman and the CEO reduces the possibility of self-
dealing by members of the management team (Fama and Jensen,
1983b).
(contiued)
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Dividends and Firm Value Relationship
Dividend and firm value have been researched extensively, at least since Modigliani and
Miller’s (M & M) seminal work (see, Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Miller and Modigliani,
1961). The implicit assumption from those prior studies has been that dividend
announcements and dividend yield measure are relevant aspects of a firm’s dividend
policy (Stevens and Jose, 1992; Frankfurter and Wood Jr., 2002; Docking and Koch, 2005).
Apart from that, La Porta et al. (2000a) documented evidence that dividends were paid
because minority shareholders pressured corporate insiders to disgorge cash. Their
findings are consistent with the agency theory that unless profits are paid out to
shareholders, they may be diverted by the insiders for personal use or committed to
unprofitable projects that provide private benefits for the insiders. As a consequence,
outside shareholders have a preference for dividends over retained earnings (La Porta et
al. 2000a). Therefore, it can be argued that dividends can play an important role to address
the agency problems between corporate insiders and outside shareholders.
According to Rozeff (1982), dividends is generally viewed as a control device that helps
reduce managerial discretion and such action is part of the firm’s optimal monitoring/
bonding package. Easterbrook (1984) and (Rozeff 1982) suggested that higher dividends
reduced agency costs by forcing management to seek external financing, resulting in
closer market scrutiny. Reduced agency costs are expected to lead to higher firm value. In
the same vein, Jensen (1986) argued that dividend reduced free cash flow that managers
Independent board of An independent director can be defined as one who is capable of
directors performing his duties independently from the management, controlling
shareholders, and the corporation (Gregory, 2000). Independent
directors on company boards are believed to be an integral component
of internal control and monitoring mechanism. Independent directors
are required as members of the Audit, Remuneration, and also
Nomination committees. These Committees are established to ensure
the integrity of financial statements issued by the company and also
to ensure that there are proper internal checks and controls with
respect to financial management in the company. In addition, as
members of the Remuneration Committee, independent board members
ensure that management do not over-pay themselves. The Nomination
Committee is responsible for searching and screening incoming
directors and filling senior appointments and ensuring that they have
sufficient skill, add knowledge and diversity to the board as a whole
(Companies Act, 1965).
Board Size A corporate board’s ability to monitor management increases as the
number of directors increases. However, this benefit may be
outweighed by the incremental cost of poorer communication and
decision-making associated with larger groups (Jensen, 1993; Lipton
and Lorsch, 1992). Yermack (1996) also documents an inverse
relationship between the firms’ market valuation and the size of the
BODs. The negative relationship between board size and firm value
has also been documented internationally.
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may otherwise divert for personal use or to fund unprofitable projects. This evidence is
consistent with the notion that dividends are paid when firms have excess cash flows in
order to reduce potential over investment by management.
Therefore, there is a need to further test this theory in one of the developing markets such
as Malaysia, particularly with the implementation of recent reform on corporate governance.
The above arguments suggest the following hypothesis in an alternative form:
H1: Dividends is positively related to firm value.
Ownership Concentration and Firm Value Relationship
The existence of large share holders and concentrated ownership are believed to be relevant
in the context of developing countries (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). Therefore, its implications
should be assessed carefully due to the country’s unique institutional specificities. Some
of these specificities are: a) a less developed and illiquid capital market, b) relatively weak
legal and regulatory framework, c) weak enforcement of the legal and regulatory frameworks
that exist, d) less active takeover market, e) a highly concentrated family-based ownership
and f) a higher dependence on external sources of financing (Claessens et al. 2000a; ADB
2000). Based on these factors, it might be argued that institutional and economic
arrangements in Malaysia are relatively specific in comparison to developed countries. If
this be true, adopting corporate governance systems from other countries without
considering these factors may lead to the ineffectiveness of the system.
Large concentrated shareholders may use their control power to influence management
decisions, which leads to expropriation or general detriment of rights of minority
shareholders (Morck et al. 1988). The potential for expropriation is exacerbated when
there is a sharp deviation in control and cash-flow rights through pyramidal holding
structure on affiliated firm capital structure and investment policies, which is shown to
have negative impact on firm valuation (Bany Ariffin, 2006). On the other hand, Chirinko
et al. (2004) find that ownership concentration does not have a discernible impact on firm
value, which may reflect large shareholders’ dual role in lowering the costs of managerial
agency problems but raising the agency costs of expropriation.
Consistent with the arguments that higher controlling shareholder can lead to entrenchment
of large owners and expropriation of minority shareholders. Therefore, this study expects
that higher ownership concentration is expected to increase agency costs, and
subsequently, lower firm value. Based on the above arguments, the following expected
hypothesis is formulated in the alternative form:
H2(a): There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration [as measured
by concentration ratio (CR5)] and firm value.
Government Ownership and Firm Value Relationship
Government has also emerged as large shareholders in public listed companies in Malaysia.
However, research in Malaysia is still very limited to ascertain whether or not the
involvement of government in corporate control system provides additional explanation
for firm value. Large ownership by government-controlled institutions may provide
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opportunities for the company to participate in public sector projects. This is due to the
possibility of easier and cheaper access to capital market. The involvement of government-
controlled institutions in the Malaysian equity market is extensive, both in terms of reach
and magnitude. In addition to the high incidence of ownership in the largest ten companies,
government-controlled institutions as a group also own about 37 per cent of the shares in
listed companies.8
Companies controlled by the government-controlled institutions are some of the largest
in terms of capitalization in the Bursa Malaysia. Share holdings by government-controlled
institutions range from 18 percent to 86 per cent for the largest 10 companies. Their high
capitalization and inclusion into the Bursa Malaysia stock market suggest that any price
movement in these shares will significantly impact the movement of the index. Thus, the
investment community closely watches the actions of the government or investment
decisions by these government-controlled institutions. For instance, when government-
backed institutional investors start operations on 10 January 2003, the Bursa Malaysia
stock market rises 1.47 percent in two hours of trading in the afternoon. The leading price
movers are the companies where the government has high ownerships.9 Government-
controlled companies are also perceived to be beneficiaries of many economic programs.
For example, when large government infrastructure projects are announced, it is almost
predictable that government related infrastructure companies will experience share price
movements as they are perceived to be likely beneficiaries of public investment projects.
However, there is also downside risk when there is large government-controlled ownership.
Companies may be asked to provide social safety nets. This may take the form of creating
employment opportunities, refraining from closing down loss-making subsidiaries,
retrenching staff and pursuing projects to achieve social objectives. These objectives may
affect pricing of goods and services and staffing decisions may constitute a drag on firm
value. Also due to the above reasons, large government-controlled ownership may result
tardiness in removal of ineffective management essential to proper governance discipline.
The active participation of government-controlled companies also gives rise to a potential
moral-hazard problem. Some of these funds are invested on behalf of major trust funds
and have the ultimate objective of balanced share ownership and wealth distribution. The
board of directors and managers may believe that the government would not allow
government-controlled companies to fail. This belief is not unfounded; given the
government through its investment-holding companies have bought back a listed
infrastructure company10, the National Airlines, and also the assets of the operator of the
urban transit system.11 It is also possible that negative activities and complacency by the
board of directors and managers induced by perverse incentives of moral hazard can lead
to poor performance. In another remark the Auditor General found that a pension fund did
not monitor the performance of companies where it has had stakes12.
Allegations of mismanagement in some of the institutions further aggravated the
perception of low accountability and professionalism in the government-controlled
firms’ investment decisions. Some of the investments have turned sour incurring large
losses. These institutions generally have large cash reserves, and have on occasions
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been tapped to buy into new government initiatives. Permodalan Nasional Berhad
(PNB), Khazanah Nasional and another pension fund own a RM10 billion government-
controlled, fund (Valuecap Sdn. Bhd.) to buy undervalued shares on the Bursa Malaysia.
Analysts speculated that government-controlled companies would be the main
beneficiaries of this new investment fund13. Thus, the following expected hypothesis
is stated in the alternative form:
H2(b): There is a negative relationship between government ownership and firm value.
Foreign Ownership and Firm Value Relationship
Many companies in Malaysia have significant foreign ownership as a result of financial
liberalization. Their share ownership ranges from a low percentage held by institutional
shareholders to large block holdings by multinationals in their subsidiaries. Two
explanations are generally offered for the behavior of foreign shareholders. Firstly, they
select companies in which they have better information. Larger and well established
companies would have less information asymmetry and generally are favored by foreign
institutional shareholders (Dahlquist and Robertson, 2001). However, the extent to which
they actively seek to monitor and engage management in order to improve firm value has
to be further empirically tested.
Secondly, large foreign multinational ownership may also have real impact on the
management and governance practices of local public listed subsidiaries and associates.
Generally, management and governance policy are applied uniformly globally, and
subsidiaries of foreign multinationals generally have access to managerial talent and skill
from the home base that can be effectively deployed to improve firm value. Hence, the
following expected hypothesis is stated in the alternative form:
H2(c): There is a positive relationship between foreign ownership and firm value
Managerial Ownership and Firm Value Relationship
The relationship between managerial ownership and firm value has been extensively
studied since Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found no significant relationship between
managerial ownership and the firm’s return on equity. Earlier studies in the U.S. also
highlighted a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm value, which
can be attributed to the alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder interests. As
managerial (insider) ownership increases, agency costs may be reduced since managers
bear a larger share of these costs. However, as Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen
(1983b) point out, managers holding a substantial portion of a firm’s equity may have
enough voting power to ensure that their position inside the company is secure. As a
result, they may become to a great extent insulated from external disciplining forces such
as the takeover threat or the managerial labour market.
The interest of large owners and managers are aligned when managers through various
incentive systems own shares in the company. When there is alignment of interest,
opportunistic behavior by controlling shareholders or managers is greatly reduced. As a
result of this alignment effect, managers have the incentive to maximize company value,
as they too benefit from improvements in firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This
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incentive alignment argument predicts that controlling shareholders and managers will
place more effort and take reasonable risk when they have a financial stake in the value of
the firm. Thus, higher managerial ownership levels are associated with better firm value.
The following hypothesis is proposed in the alternative form:
H2(d): There is positive relationship between managerial (insider) ownership and firm
value.
The Moderating Effects of Board Governance with Dividends and
Ownership Structure on Firm Value Relationship
The governance role of board of directors is the “heart” of corporate governance as
shareholders have delegated authority to the board to oversee and control decisions
made by upper management (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). According to the agency theory,
firms might minimize agency costs by establishing appropriate monitoring systems and
using board governance to effectively supervise managers (Byrd and Hickman, 1992;
Fama and Jensen, 1983b). As described by various recommendations and rules for
governance reforms (The Cadbury Committee 1992; MCCG 2000; KLSE 2001), this study
characterises board governance as strong when a firm adopts best governance practices.
Thus, the strong board governance considered in this study include; non-board duality,
greater board independence and smaller board size.
Dividends and Board Duality on Firm Value
Boards of directors are groups of elected individuals whose main responsibility is to act
in the owners’ interests by monitoring and controlling the corporations’ top-level
executives. Firm shareholders, particularly large shareholders such as institutional
investors, argue for separating the roles to eliminate CEO entrenchment and to increase
the effectiveness of board monitoring (Daily and Dalton, 1997).
If, as argued by Callaghan (2005), duality may constrain independence, erodes corporate
checks and balances, monitoring and oversight; then dividends are expected to be lower/
weaker for firms duality board than for CEO-Chair separation (non-duality) firms. The
separation of roles between Board Chairman and CEO also has been recommended by the
MCCG 2001. In line with the above arguments, this study expects that the moderating
effect of board duality with dividends has a lower/negative effect on firm value. The
following hypothesis is stated in the alternative form:
H3(a): Board duality may moderate the strength/form of the relationship between
dividends and firm value.
Dividends and Board Independence on Firm Value
Weisbach (1988) provides evidence that the greater the number of outside directors on
the board, the stronger the corporate governance of the firm. Thus, dividends are expected
to be higher/stronger when a firm has independent outside directors. Any board member
who is not formally part of the company would be considered as an outside director. In
this regard, some recommendations have been made to reduce the size of the board and
to appoint a higher proportion of independent directors (Bozec and Dia, 2005). Fama and
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Jensen (1983) argue that manager-monitoring activities of the board will be more effective
when they are dominated by independent-outside directors. The following hypothesis
is stated in the alternative form:
H3(b): Board independence may moderate the strength/form of the relationship between
dividends and firm value.
Dividends and Board Size on Firm Value
A large board is unlikely to facilitate effective monitoring of top management of firm
(Jensen, 1993). Thus, small board size is more effective to limit directors’ incentives to
shirk, as it is easier to monitor each member and decisions can be made more quickly
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Consistent with this argument, Yermack (1996) also provided
evidence that dividends and firm value were decreasing functions of board size. The
following hypothesis is stated in the alternative form:
H3(c): Board size may moderate the strength/form of the relationship between dividends
and firm value.
Ownership Structure and Board Duality on Firm Value
A powerful CEO can influence the board’s ability to carry out its legal role by representing
shareholder interests or its independence (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). Since the CEO has the
ability to shape board membership overtime (Alderfer, 1986), the CEO can gain power the
longer he/she holds the position (Mishra and Nielsen, 2000). The dual leadership structure
allows the CEO to exert more power over the decisions and practices of the board, and
also permits the CEO to effectively control the information available to other members of
the board (Booth et al. 2002).
Duality also weakens the board’s independence in making decisions because the CEO
acquires more control and power, therefore it promotes CEO entrenchment (Bozec and
Dia, 2007). On the contraty, duality can be seen as a positive advantage to the firm
because it provides a unified firm leadership (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). The separation
of roles between Board Chairman and CEO also has been recommended by the MCCG
(2001). Accordingly, Nazli and Weetman (2006) argue that the Chairman plays a crucial
role in encouraging debates on issues brought to the board and ensuring that resolutions
are decided by votes, thus those roles can be performed better if the Chairman is an
independent director. In line with the above arguments, this study proposes the following
hypothesis in the alternative form:
H4(a): Board duality may moderate the strength/form of the relationship between
ownership structure and firm value.
Ownership Structure and Board Independence on Firm Value
The fraction of outside directors is an internal decision and such a decision should be
expected to maximize value. The positive relationship is expected because of the positive
impact of monitoring function of the independent directors. Helland and Sykuta (2005)
suggest that boards with higher proportions of outside independent directors do a
better job of monitoring management.
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As a result of regulatory reforms, the rules of corporate governance have been restructured
to require more outside directors, with more meaningful participation by them and create a
notion that outside directors are better monitors (Belden et al. 2005). In this context, some
recommendations have been made to reduce the size of the board and to appoint a higher
proportion of independent directors (Bozec and Dia, 2005). Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue
that manager-monitoring activities of the board will be more effective when they are dominated
by independent-outside directors. The lack of past research testing for the relationship
between ownership structure and board independence calls for the applicability of the
moderating effect to the ownership structure with board independence on firm value
relationship. This study proposes the following hypothesis in the alternative form:
H4(b): Board independence may moderate the strength/form of the relationship
between ownership structure and firm value.
Ownership Structure and Board Size on Firm Value
Prior studies have proposed three main sources for board-size effects, that is: (a) increases
communication and coordination problems; (b) decreased ability of the board to control
management; and (c) the spread among a larger group of the cost of poor decision making
(Eisenberg et al. 1998; Yermack, 1996). As board structure group increases in size, losses
in productivity and efficiency arise due to coordination and process problems (Jensen
1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). This in turn, leads to ineffective monitoring and control of
management by the board of directors.
The board of directors contributes to alleviate agency costs in the firm by monitoring and
rewarding top executives to ensure wealth maximization to the shareholders (Bozec and
Dia, 2007). When too many directors are serving on the board, directors are then less
effective in monitoring managers, thus agency costs increase. On the other hand, a small
board is more effective to limit directors’ incentives to shirk, as it is easier to monitor each
member and decisions can be made more quickly (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). As controlling
shareholders are in power to decide whether and how firm’s profits are distributed, the
corporate board should predominantly ensure that all shareholders are equally treated
per unit of equity in the firm (Bena and Hanousek, 2006). This study then proposes the
following hypothesis in the alternative form:
H4(c): Board size may moderate the strength/form of the relationship between ownership
structure and firm value.
Sample and Data
This study was conducted after the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate
Governance (MCCG) through the amendments of Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements,
announced in January 2001. Since then, it is documented that with various best practices
and recommendations, the listed companies in Malaysia have improved their corporate
governance environment (KLSE-PricewaterhouseCoopers 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib 2006;
Yatim et al. 2006). Therefore, the sample years of 2002 and 2005 were chosen to represent
two years of the MCCG becoming mandatory through a revamp of Bursa Malaysia
listing requirements.
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This study focused on non financial public listed firms listed on the Main Board14 of
Bursa Malaysia whose annual reports were available for years 2002 and 2005. The Main
Board companies are significantly larger in terms of size and sales. Firms in the Second
Board are eligible to transfer their listing to the Main Board upon fulfilling regulations and
listing criteria of the Main Board. All finance-related firms, banks, insurance, unit trusts
and utilities companies were excluded from the sample due to their difference in the
regulatory requirements, financial reporting standards and compliance (see, Claessens et
al. 2002; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2005b; Yatim et al. 2006). Firms that are classified as
PN4 companies were also excluded from the sample. Finally, this study was left with the
sample of 406 firms covering more than half of Malaysian listed non financial companies
and representing a broad range of industry sectors. The larger numbers of firms sample
were expected to make the study more transparent and representative of firms in Malaysia.
Data on different types of ownership structure and board governance were obtained from
individual company annual reports. These annual reports were available and downloadable
from the website of the exchange (http://announcements.bursamalaysia.com). DataStream
financial database also provided all types of annual financial data, assets and liabilities.
Apart from that, this study employed annual data, of years 2002 and 2005. Using of annual
data allowed the study to capture more discretionary rather than autonomous behavior.
Besides, annual data represents the highest periodicity for which data is systematically
available.
Dependent Variables
Firm Value: Tobin’s Q Ratio (Q-Ratio). This study employed Tobin’s Q ratio (Q-Ratio) as
a measure of firm value, which is market-value based measure of performance. Firm value
was measured using Tobin’s Q ratio for two reasons. First, there is no consensus concerning
the measure of firm financial performance, and performance measures fall into two
categories either accounting rate of return or market return measures (Chakravarthy 1986;
Daily and Dalton, 1997). Tobin’s Q ratio is an alternative to profitability and holding
period rate-of-return measures (Stevens and Jose, 1992). Second, both accounting and
market measures have inherent advantages and disadvantages. For example, market
measures can provide accurate information concerning shareholders’ wealth maximization
(Mikkelson and Partch, 1997). However, market measure also can be biased by bullish
expectations, therefore fail to reflect actual firm valuation or performance.
The basic calculation of Tobin’s q ratio is the ratio of the market value of a firm’s equity
and debt to the replacement cost of its asset. Lindenberg and Ross (1981) calculate it as:
NETCAPBVCAPTASST
STASSTCLLTDMVEPSQLR +−
−+++
=
where, PS  is liquidating value of firm’s preferred stock, MVE is market value of equity at
the end of the year, LTD is long-term debt adjusted for age structure, CL is book value of
current liabilities, STASST is net short-term assets, BVCAP is book value of net capital
stock, and NETCAP is inflation adjusted net capital stock.
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However, this formula could be complicated because of the unavailability of some data of
the data to calculate it especially in the emerging market such as Malaysia. Chung and
Pruittt (1994) simplified the calculation as follows:
TOTASST
TDEBTPSMVEQCP
++
=
where, MVE is market value of equity, PS is outstanding preferred stocks, TDEBT is book
value of short-term liabilities net of short-term assets, plus book value of long-term debt,
and TOTASST is book value of total assets.
Therefore, this study utilised the calculation of the modified version of Tobin’s q ratio as
a measure of firm value, calculated as the ratio of sum of market value of equity plus total
debts to book value of total assets. The modified version of Tobin’s Q ratio is depicted as
the following equation:
TOTASST
TDEBTMVEQratio
+
=
where, MVE is market value of equity, TDEBT is book value of short-term liabilities net
of short-term assets, plus book value of long-term debt, and TOTASST is book value of
total assets.
This proxy is extensively used in a lot of research (e.g.: Mehran, 1995; Rathinasamy et al.
2000; Faizah, 2006). Firms with high Tobin’s Q ratio (or Tobin’s Q > 1) indicate that the
market views the firm’s internal organization as exceptionally good or the expected agency
costs are particularly small (Faizah 2006).
Independent Variables
Dividends. Dividend was primarily measured by dividend yield (dividend-to-price
ratio). Formally, the dividend yield is the dividend per share (DPS) divided by closing
market price per share (MPS), that is, DYLD = DPS / MPS. The dividend yield was used
rather than the payout ratio (dividends to earnings) for two reasons. Firstly, the
denominator in dividend yield is a market measure (share price) compared to an
accounting measure (net income). Secondly, to avoid problems of negative payout
ratios are resulting from negative earnings or excessively high payout ratios resulting
from income being close to zero (Schooley and Barney, 1994). Several other studies
also employed dividend yield as a measure of dividend policy (e.g:, Chang and Rhee,
1990; Han et al. 1999; Ho et al. 2004).
Ownership Structure. Four types of ownership structure measures were used in this
study.
(a) Ownership concentration. Several measures were used to proxy for ownership
concentration in the previous literature (for instance, Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990;
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Duggal and Millar, 1999; Claessens et al. 2000a, 2000b;
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Wang, 2005; Chen et al. 2005; Selarka, 2005; Khan, 2006). To proxy for ownership
concentration, this study employed concentration ratio 5 (CR5) as measured by total
percentage of shares owned by largest shareholder (Top1) divided by the sum of shares
in the hands of largest five shareholders as follows; ∑
=
=
5
1
15
i
iTopCR γ , where iγ  is
the total percentage of shares owned by the largest five shareholders i, and i = 1, 2, …, 5.
(b) Government ownership15. To measure government ownership (GOWN), the sum
of all shares held by government-controlled companies in the list of thirty largest
shareholders were identified.
(c) Foreign ownership. The percentage of total shares held by foreign shareholders
was also identified in the same manner. To calculate total percentage of foreign
shareholdings (FOWN), the sums of all shares in the hands foreign shareholders in the
list of thirty largest either held through nominee companies or other corporate foreign
share holdings were identified.
(d) Managerial ownership. A number of studies used directors’ share holdings
as a proxy for managerial ownership (e.g., Morck et al. 1988; Chen et al. 2003). Managerial
ownership (MOWN) was measured as the total percentage of shares directly held by
non-independent executive directors in the company. Following Nazli and Weetman
(2006), this study did not include the shares held by independent non-executive
(outside) directors because they are expected to play a monitoring role and limit
managerial opportunism.
Moderating Variables
Board Chairman and CEO Duality.The separation of roles for the Board Chairman and
the CEO was measured as a dummy variable (DUALITY). This was to represent whether or
not the CEO also served as the Chairman of the Board (Gani and Jermias 2006). If there is
a separation, the variable takes the value of 1 and 0 otherwise.
Board Independence. On board independence, this study employed size of
independent non-executive (outside) directors as measured by the total numbers of
independent non-executive (outside) directors on the board (IND). Independent non-
executive directors are outside directors whose principal occupations are not with the
company as indicated in the proxy statements (Chen et al. 2003). The role of an independent
non-executive director is to provide an outsider’s contribution and oversight to the board
of directors (Hanrahan et al. 2001, cited in Puan et al. 2006). Weisbach (1988) suggests
that some outside directors could have current or potential business ties to firm, providing
them with incentives to side with management. Therefore, following Borokhovich et al.
(2005), this study strictly define outside directors as those outside directors who have no
current or potential business ties to firm.
Board Size. The size of the board of directors might also affect corporate payout and
firm value through the relative influence of the CEO on various board sizes (Gani and
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Jermias 2006). Yermack (1996) argues that larger boards are less effective and more
susceptible to the influence of the CEO. The board size variable (BSIZE) represents the
total number of directors on the board as of reported in the company’s annual report.
Control Variables
Firm Size. This study included a measure of firm size because it is possible that
larger firms are perceived differently by shareholders. Further, larger firms may pay
higher dividend levels and may have larger boards. On the other hand, Bhabra (2007)
demonstrates that firm value is inversely related to firm size. This could be the result of
a number of factors such as lack of focus or a lesser degree of transparency in managerial
actions. However, Short and Keasey (1999) report that firm size has a significantly positive
effect on performance, since larger firms have the potential to access funds with greater
ease, both internally and externally. Larger companies may also have better growth
opportunities and access to financing opportunities. Larger companies may have greater
analyst following and thus have more information available to reduce information
asymmetry and a wider share spread and ownership profile. Accordingly, many past
studies have used total assets16 as a proxy for firm size. Alternatively, another proxy for
firm size is commonly used in prior research is market capitalisation. This study employed
logarithm function of market capitalization (LOGMCAP) as the indicator of firm size.
Firm Age. The age of the company also has an effect on the distribution of
shareholdings. Older companies, having gone through many business cycles could have
a wider shareholder distribution. This study employed the age of listing (AGE) as a proxy
for company age rather than the year of incorporation to control for firm maturity.
Leverage. Prior studies include a control variable to proxy for the level of
indebtedness17. However, literature on the association between leverage and firm value is
divided. While Jensen (1986) stresses the importance of debt in limiting managerial
discretion over the use of free cash flow, studies such as Stulz (1988) and Bhabra (2007)
suggest an inverse relationship between leverage and firm value. Hence, leverage influences
firm value through monitoring activities by debt holders, thus this study measured it as
total debt divided by total assets to proxy for financial leverage (LEVERAGE).
Profitability. Earnings per share (EPS) was used as a measure of a firm’s profitability
(see, Kumar and Sopariwala, 1992; Ahmed and Khababa, 1999; and Kaufmann et al. 2000;
Al-Malkawi, 2005). EPS is also considered to be “the market’s pre-eminent measure of
firm performance” (Kaufmann et al. 2000: 219).
Industry Sectors. Past studies define industries by using various levels of industry
classification numbers. For example, Holderness et al. (1999) use 1-digit SIC codes to
classify industries. Industry differences are controlled using industry categorisation
provided by Bursa Malaysia. Since the study sample included firms operating in a variety
of sectors, controlling for industry-specific effects assures the reliability of the results
(Renneboog and Trojanowski 2005b). In addition, companies in different industry sectors
differ with respect to the degree of free cash flow problems and, consequently, corporate
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dividends (Moh’d et al. 1995). This study employed three main industry sectors in the
model equation, namely; trade and services, industrial products and consumer products
to control for differences in industry sectors.
Methodology and Empirical Model
Multivariate regression analysis was appropriate in this study because the data were
cross-sectional and thus did not suffer from autocorrelation problems. The moderated
multivariate regression analysis is a commonly used statistical technique for studies
predicting the effect of moderator variables on dependent variables (Gerdin and Greve,
2004; Gani and Jermias, 2006). In addition, Hartmann and Moers, (1999) argue that
moderated regression analysis is the appropriate statistical technique by which to test
hypotheses involving interaction terms because it is “a specific application of
multivariate regression analysis, in which the regression equation contains an
interaction term” (Hartmann and Moers, 1999: 293). Moderating effect occurs when the
moderator variable, a second independent variable, changes the form or the strength of
the relationship between another independent variable and dependent variable (Hair et
al. 1998). This is also known as an interaction effect.
The empirical model used in this study can be described as follows:
Model 1:
Q-Ratioi = β0 + βiDYLDi± jj j
OS∑
=
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β ± k
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=
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Model 2:
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where, β0 is intercept, Q-Ratioi is Tobin’s q ratio as a measure of firm value, DYLDi is
dividend policy of firm i determined by dividend yield, OSj denotes types of ownership
structure, namely, ownership concentration, government, foreign and managerial
ownership, BGk denotes board governance of board duality, board independent and
board size, Controll are control variables of firm size, firm age, leverage, profitability and
industry sectors, and εi is error term.
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients for main variables are provided in Table 1a and
1b. It indicates that multicollinearity18 is not a problem, as the correlations are relatively
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low19. An analysis of residuals, plots of the studentised residuals against predicted values
and the Q-Q plot were conducted to test for homoscedasticity and linearity assumptions.
Results of standard tests on skewness and kurtosis indicated no problem with the normality
assumption20. The standardized residuals were plotted against predicted dependent values
and the independent variables. Judge et al. (1988) suggested that any observations that
have standardized residuals greater than ± 4 should be deleted in order to reduce the
undue effects of the outliers and the problems of heterocedasticity (non-constant
variance). However, none of observations was eliminated for each year data through this
procedure. Finally, the study used a Q-Q plot to check for normality of residual. Since the
residual points were fairly close to a straight line, the distribution of residuals was fairly
normal. Additionally, the regression analysis is robust with respect to misspecification of
the probability law of residuals (Chatterjee and Price, 1991). In sum, the two models do not
violate basic OLS assumptions and could be used for testing the expected hypotheses in
this study.
Before performing an empirical analysis, the descriptive analysis was conducted to study
the behavior of all the variables of interest in the models. For that purpose, Table 2
provides the descriptive statistics for key variables used in the study over the period 2002
and 2005. Focusing on the dependent variables, it can be seen that the average firm value
(Q-Ratio) increased between the intervening years, which is possibly indicating the effect
of overall economic improvement for the firm value is as expected. Q-ratio had an average
value of 1.4619 and 1.6563, being the minimum value of 0.015 and 0.016 and maximum value
of 18.720 and 16.580, for years 2002 and 2005 respectively.
As for board governance variables, it can be seen that the average of total numbers of
independent non executive (outside) directors of Malaysian listed companies was three,
ranging from zero and eight. The average number of independent directors also increased
from 2.96 in 2002 to 3.03 in 2005. This could be attributed to the recommendations of the
MCCG 2001, which requires that at least one third of the directors should be independent
directors. An alternative explanation is that loss making companies are more likely to
appoint more independent directors as part of the restructuring that is still ongoing after
year 2001. In terms of average board size, Malaysian listed companies have on average
eight directors on the board, which is within the size recommended by Lipton and Lorsch
(1992) for board effectiveness. Additionally, the number of firms with role duality has
slightly decreased from 32 per cent to 31 per cent, supporting the recommendations of the
MCCG 2001 to separate the roles for the Chairman and CEO.
Interestingly, it is worth noting that the mean of ownership structure variables show some
particular patterns. The mean percentage of ownership concentration ratio, CR5, was
about 0.52 for both years with the highest around 0.95, indicating that highly concentrated
firms are common among Malaysian listed firms. The findings are consistent with those
reported in earlier studies (e.g., Claessens et al. 2000a; Faccio and Lang, 2002; ROSC
2005). On government ownership variable, the mean percentage was 6.63 per cent in 2002
and 5.86 per cent in 2005, ranging from 0 per cent to 79.18 per cent and 0 per cent to 78.46
per cent for years 2002 and 2005, respectively. Of particular interest, foreign ownership
increased on average from 4.54 per cent to 6.12 per cent. The increase in foreign
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shareholdings could be partly due to regulatory changes and strong investors’ confidence
in the Malaysian corporate governance after been badly affected by the crisis. During the
financial crisis, Malaysia was removed from the Morgan Stanley Capital Index which
badly affected the flow of foreign funds. Finally, managerial ownership was on average
showing slightly decrease from 7.51 to 7.32 per cent for years 2002 and 2005, respectively.
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses
Table 3a and 4.3b report the regression results of dividends, ownership structure and
board governance on firm value (Q-ratio) for years 2002 and 2005, after controlling for the
effect of firm size, age, leverage, earnings and industry sectors. The full Model 3 in both
tables provides a benchmark for later results and analysis of moderating effects. The F-
statistics for Model 3 was both insignificant and the R2 was 35.0 per cent and 28.6 per cent
for years 2002 and 2005, respectively. As for Model 2, the change in R2 was 2.5 per cent
and 5.4 per cent for the year 2002 and 2005, respectively. Whereas for Model 3, the change
in R2 was only 0.2 per cent and 0.3 per cent for the year 2002 and 2005, respectively. As
shown in Model 3 of Table 3a and 4.3b; dividends (DYLD) provided significantly positive
effect (with p<0.01) on firm value for both years, thus the result supported H1(a).
Of particular interests were the results of government (V2_GOWN) and foreign
(V3_FOWN) ownership on firm value. The results indicate the significant positive
relationship of government ownership (with p<0.05) and inverse relationship of foreign
ownership (with p<0.1) on firm value in the year 2002. Therefore, both results did not
support the expected hypotheses. The positive relationship between government
ownership and firm value implies that investors in the Malaysian market do value the
higher standards of corporate governance reform found in the government-controlled
firms. In addition, the result also suggests that foreign ownership does play an active
monitoring role in Malaysia as one of emerging economies to mitigate potential managerial
opportunism and control the agency costs of free cash flow. However, both government
and foreign ownership show insignificant results in the year 2005.
The results of examining the effects of board governance variables on firm value for the
years 2002 and 2005 are also reported in Table 3a and 4.3b. However, the results were not
significant with all predicted variables.
Results of Moderated Regression Analyses
To investigate further whether board governance had moderator effect on the relationship
between dividends and types of ownership structure on firm value, the interaction terms as
a control device was considered. Model 2, from Table 4a and 4b shows regression results
involving the moderating effects of dividends and ownership structure with board governance
on firm value for the year 2002 and 2005. The interaction results of Model 2 in Table 4a and 4b,
taken together, were used to determine whether the interaction hypotheses in the study were
supported. If board governance variables significantly interact with dividends and ownership
structure, the conclusion is that the board governance variables have a moderating effect on
the relationship between dividends and ownership structure on firm value.
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The result of direct effect that has previously reported reveals that dividend has a positive
significant effect on firm value. However, the valuation effect of dividend with board
duality provided lower positive coefficient term significantly. Therefore, the result
supported the expected hypothesis. Interestingly and consistent with what is predicted,
the interaction term of dividends with size of independent non-executive directors, DYLD
X M2_IND, shows significantly positive effect for the year 2005 with p<0.01. This implies
that firm value is enhanced in firms that increase their dividends and size of board
independence, supporting H3(b). Correspondingly, the result suggests that size of board
independence has a moderating effect as it changes the strength of direct relationship
between dividends and firm value. However, the result was not significant in the year
2002. Whereas, the interaction term between dividends and board size showed significantly
positive moderating effect for both years.
The result from the interaction effect of board duality with government ownership provided
negatively significant result for the year 2002, thus, supporting H4(a). However, the result
was insignificant in the year 2005. Further, the interaction term of foreign ownership and
board size, V3_FOWN X M3_BSIZE, was negative and significant (with p<0.1) in the
year 2002, however the result was not significant in year 2005.
Conclusion
This paper examines the relationships between dividends, types of ownership structure
and board governance variables on firm value among Malaysian listed companies. Both
direct and moderating effects were examined. The result of direct effect shows that
dividend has a positive significant effect on firm value in both years. This finding is
consistent with the view that dividends mitigate agency costs of free cash flow problem,
therefore increasing firm value. The finding also suggests that dividends can play its
important monitoring role in reducing agency costs among Malaysian listed firms. Results
of government and foreign ownership on firm value are particularly interesting as they
are contrary to the expectations. Surprisingly, results on ownership concentration and
managerial ownership provided insignificant effect to firm value for both years. Further,
results on board governance variables on firm value for the year 2002 and 2005 also
provided insignificant effect.
Of particular interest were the results of moderating effects of board governance with
dividends and ownership structure on firm value. The result reveals that board duality
has significantly moderated the relationship between dividends and firm value with a
lower coefficient positive effect as expected. This result supported the expected
hypothesis. As expected, the result from the moderating effect of board duality with
government ownership in the year 2002 provided a negatively significant result. However,
both results of board duality with dividends and government ownership provided
insignificant effect for the year 2005. Whereas, the interaction term between dividends
and board size showed significantly lower coefficient positive moderating effect for
both years. The inclusion of board size interaction term to foreign ownership provided
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significantly negative effect on firm value. The negative moderating effect of board size
was consistent to what was predicted. Firms with a smaller board were in a better position
to cope with firm’s dividend decision than firms with a larger board, which is consistent
with recent reports on corporate governance that have stressed the importance of having
smaller boards. This also might be due to reason that a larger board has representation
of people with diverse backgrounds and knowledge (Bozec and Dia, 2007), which suggests
less efficient monitoring on managers’ discretion leading to lower valuation. Therefore,
it suggests that Malaysian listed firms need to assess the appropriate board size
depending on each individual firm’s circumstances.
Overall, findings from this paper reveal that good board governance; particularly
board independence and board size can enhance the monitoring role of dividends,
government and foreign ownership in reducing agency costs, thus increase firm value.
While many previous studies have examined the direct effect of ownership structure
and firm value, this study was one of the few studies that explicitly investigated the
moderating effects of three board governance mechanisms on the relationship between
dividends and types of ownership structure with firm value. In doing so, this study
contributed to the extant literature.
The findings also have important implications. First, from policy perspective, the results
demonstrate that board governance may work in tandem with dividends to mitigate agency
cost of free cash flow that could not be mitigate in the direct relationship of dividends and
firm value. Also, the separation role of the Chair and the CEO becomes less important in
controlling agency conflicts. Second, although the recent reforms aim to tighten requirements
for board independence, smaller board size and non-role duality and thereby facilitate more
effective board supervision of managers (e.g., MCCG, 2001, KLSE, 2001; OECD Principles
of Corporate Governance 2004; ROSC 2005), however, the results from this study reveal
that the effect of the increased “good” board governance together with dividends and
ownership structure on firm value might not be the same for all firms.
The conclusions drawn from this study should be interpreted by limitations, which would
potentially represent opportunities for further investigation in the future study. The main
limitation is that the data period in the study covered only for the years 2002 and 2005,
which were after the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance
through the amendments of Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements in the year 2001.
Different results may be generated if a panel data analysis is employed.
In conclusion, with the reform of corporate governance practices coming under increasing
scrutiny in the post-reforms era and an increasing demand for convergence of financial
reporting standards, policymakers should not lose sight of the fact that there are existing
mechanisms that provide strong incentives and motivations to the good governance
practices of companies. The benefits of increasing firm value through enhanced board
governance are not the same across all firms as their incentives vary with respect to types
of ownership structure and dividends.
MALAYSIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, VOLUME 7 NO. 2, 2008
78
Ta
bl
e 1
a:
 P
ea
rs
on
 co
rr
el
at
io
n 
m
at
rix
 o
f v
ar
ia
bl
es
 u
se
d 
in
 th
e s
tu
dy
 fo
r t
he
 y
ea
r 2
00
2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1.
 Q
-R
AT
IO
1
0.
29
0*
*
0.
06
2
0.
22
2*
*
0.
04
6
-0
.1
30
**
-0
.0
26
0.
06
3
0.
16
3*
*
0.
56
0*
*
0.
13
2*
*
0.
01
0
-0
.0
72
0.
08
2
-0
.0
44
0.
01
3
2.
 D
Y
LD
1
0.
12
7*
0.
08
3
0.
08
8
-0
.0
82
-0
.0
69
0.
05
4
0.
21
9*
*
0.
31
0*
*
0.
12
3*
0.
11
2*
-0
.1
42
**
-0
.0
57
0.
05
2
0.
04
6
3.
 V
1_
C
R
5
1
0.
10
7*
-0
.0
34
-0
.2
75
**
-0
.0
92
-0
.0
53
-0
.0
18
0.
06
9
0.
13
8*
*
-0
.0
35
0.
03
4
-0
.0
16
-0
.0
51
0.
07
1
4.
 V
2_
G
O
W
N
1
0.
01
6
-0
.1
57
**
-0
.1
09
*
0.
13
9*
*
0.
24
1*
*
0.
24
1*
*
0.
05
1
0.
00
3
0.
02
9
0.
02
2
0.
02
7
-0
.0
27
5.
 V
3_
FO
W
N
1
-0
.0
88
-0
.0
58
0.
06
2
0.
14
6*
*
0.
19
9*
*
0.
14
9*
*
-0
.0
21
0.
05
1
0.
06
1
-0
.0
01
0.
03
3
6.
 V
4_
M
O
W
N
1
0.
14
6*
*
-0
.0
96
-0
.1
27
*
-0
.2
28
**
-0
.2
80
**
0.
03
9
0.
05
2
-0
.1
00
*
0.
07
4
0.
00
2
7.
 M
1_
D
U
A
LI
TY
1
-0
.0
34
-0
.0
83
-0
.0
30
-0
.1
01
*
0.
00
7
-0
.0
45
-0
.0
94
0.
02
9
-0
.0
49
8.
 M
2_
IN
D
1
0.
55
4*
*
0.
16
2*
*
0.
04
9
0.
07
7
-0
.0
33
0.
08
0
-0
.0
95
0.
01
1
9.
 M
3_
B
SI
ZE
1
0.
30
0*
*
-0
.0
79
0.
15
8*
*
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
20
0.
06
1
10
. L
O
G
M
C
A
P
1
0.
17
1*
*
-0
.0
34
-0
.0
20
0.
18
5*
*
-0
.0
87
-0
.0
81
11
. A
G
E
1
-0
.0
19
-0
.0
17
-0
.0
75
-0
.0
53
-0
.0
12
12
. L
EV
ER
A
G
E
1
-0
.0
64
0.
02
7
-0
.0
22
-0
.0
22
13
. E
PS
1
0.
02
7
-0
.0
62
0.
01
4
14
. 
TS
1
-0
.3
04
**
-0
.2
08
**
15
. I
P
1
-0
.2
39
**
16
. C
P
1
No
te
:
**
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t t
he
 0
.0
1 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
.
* 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t t
he
 0
.0
5 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
.
DIVIDENDS, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND BOARD GOVERNANCE ON FIRM VALUE
79
Ta
bl
e 1
b:
 P
ea
rs
on
 co
rr
el
at
io
n 
m
at
rix
 o
f v
ar
ia
bl
es
 u
se
d 
in
 th
e s
tu
dy
 fo
r t
he
 y
ea
r 2
00
5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1.
 Q
-R
AT
IO
1
0.
35
3*
*
0.
08
4
0.
08
8
0.
05
6
-0
.1
05
*
-0
.0
33
0.
13
8*
*
0.
10
4*
0.
46
7*
*
0.
11
4*
-0
.0
51
-0
.0
47
0.
02
9
-0
.0
79
0.
02
3
2.
 D
Y
LD
1
0.
10
7*
0.
02
9
0.
01
3
-0
.0
47
-0
.0
68
0.
05
7
0.
04
5
0.
29
3*
*
0.
10
3*
0.
10
7*
-0
.0
97
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
53
0.
13
8*
*
3.
 V
1_
C
R
5
1
0.
09
0
-0
.0
47
-0
.2
95
**
-0
.0
85
0.
06
6
0.
04
2
0.
13
4*
*
0.
17
4*
*
0.
00
0
-0
.0
63
-0
.0
49
-0
.0
01
0.
08
8
4.
 V
2_
G
O
W
N
1
-0
.0
23
-0
.1
03
*
-0
.0
68
0.
06
2
0.
13
6*
*
0.
22
9*
*
-0
.0
08
0.
05
8
-0
.0
75
-0
.0
06
-0
.0
54
0.
04
0
5.
 V
3_
FO
W
N
1
-0
.0
48
0.
00
3
0.
05
4
0.
06
3
0.
26
1*
*
0.
11
3*
0.
00
6
0.
03
7
0.
07
8
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
22
6.
 V
4_
M
O
W
N
1
0.
06
4
-0
.0
81
-0
.0
58
-0
.2
06
**
-0
.3
04
**
-0
.0
42
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
63
0.
01
8
0.
04
7
7.
 M
1_
D
U
A
LI
TY
1
-0
.0
97
-0
.1
21
*
-0
.0
60
-0
.1
25
*
-0
.1
13
*
0.
05
1
-0
.0
68
0.
02
0
-0
.0
35
8.
 M
2_
IN
D
1
0.
57
3*
*
0.
20
0*
*
0.
10
9*
0.
01
7
-0
.0
11
0.
06
1
-0
.0
37
0.
01
5
9.
 M
3_
B
SI
ZE
1
0.
24
0*
*
-0
.0
72
0.
05
4
-0
.0
52
0.
03
5
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
25
10
. L
O
G
M
C
A
P
1
0.
21
2*
*
0.
02
3
-0
.0
35
0.
15
3*
*
-0
.0
70
-0
.0
69
11
. A
G
E
1
-0
.0
20
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
75
-0
.0
53
-0
.0
13
12
. L
EV
ER
A
G
E
1
-0
.0
60
0.
01
3
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
12
13
. E
PS
1
0.
11
0*
0.
00
4
-0
.0
15
14
. 
TS
1
-0
.3
04
**
-0
.2
06
**
15
. I
P
1
-0
.2
36
**
16
. C
P
1
N
ot
e:
**
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t t
he
 0
.0
1 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
.
* 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t t
he
 0
.0
5 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
.
MALAYSIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, VOLUME 7 NO. 2, 2008
80
Ta
bl
e 2
 S
um
m
ar
y 
de
sc
rip
tiv
e s
ta
tis
tic
s o
f t
he
 y
ea
rs
 2
00
2 
an
d 
20
05
Sa
m
pl
e
M
in
im
um
M
ax
im
um
M
ea
n
St
an
da
rd
 D
ev
ia
tio
n
Sk
ew
ne
ss
K
ur
to
si
s
N
 =
 4
06
20
02
20
05
20
02
20
05
20
02
20
05
20
02
20
05
20
02
20
05
20
02
20
05
Q
-R
AT
IO
0.
01
5
0.
01
6
18
.7
20
16
.5
80
1.
46
19
1.
65
63
2.
39
16
2.
82
05
4.
28
0
3.
42
6
22
.3
60
12
.3
59
D
Y
LD
0
0
1.
90
3
7.
71
4
0.
07
35
0.
12
17
0.
20
88
0.
50
08
5.
67
5
11
.5
38
36
.7
63
15
5.
91
9
V
1_
C
R
5
0.
03
6
0.
17
6
0.
95
9
0.
93
9
0.
51
7
0.
52
4
0.
19
2
0.
18
7
0.
42
5
0.
40
4
-0
.7
65
-0
.8
50
V
2_
G
O
W
N
a
0
0
79
.1
80
78
.4
60
6.
63
3
5.
86
28
1
12
.0
19
10
.5
25
3.
32
5
3.
73
7
13
.1
58
17
.1
94
V
3_
FO
W
N
b
0
0
76
.0
10
76
.8
00
4.
53
7
6.
11
85
3
8.
80
1
9.
92
2
4.
26
9
3.
26
7
23
.9
59
13
.7
83
V
4_
M
O
W
N
c
0
0
68
.8
00
64
.8
30
7.
50
9
7.
31
45
8
12
.8
26
12
.5
61
2.
27
9
2.
16
5
5.
08
4
4.
38
4
M
1_
D
U
A
LI
TY
d
0
0
1
1
0.
32
0.
31
0.
46
7
0.
46
2
0.
77
4
0.
83
5
-1
.4
08
-1
.3
08
M
2_
IN
D
0
0
8
6
2.
96
3.
03
0.
97
3
1.
00
8
0.
96
3
0.
45
4
2.
71
8
0.
82
0
M
3_
B
SI
ZE
4
4
20
15
8.
11
7.
91
2.
22
4
2.
13
5
0.
95
7
0.
62
6
2.
65
4
0.
36
7
M
C
A
P 
(in
 m
ill
io
n)
14
74
5
37
27
13
85
11
20
20
99
99
80
68
50
50
.4
3
79
64
40
.0
0
16
88
70
1.
96
2
21
46
93
0.
99
8
5.
03
6
5.
46
9
28
.9
20
35
.4
08
LO
G
M
C
A
P
4.
16
9
3.
57
1
7.
14
1
7.
32
2
5.
35
0
5.
33
2
0.
55
2
0.
63
0
0.
93
8
0.
65
1
0.
65
4
0.
52
0
A
G
E
0
3
41
44
14
.5
1
17
.5
1
12
.0
89
12
.0
89
0.
73
0
0.
73
0
-0
.8
05
-0
.8
05
LE
V
ER
A
G
E
0
0
10
.2
73
1.
34
7
0.
27
1
0.
21
7
0.
71
0
0.
20
1
12
.6
26
1.
08
7
17
1.
32
8
2.
11
6
EP
S
0
0
2.
26
0
2.
82
0
0.
15
7
0.
16
0
0.
26
4
0.
24
7
4.
18
2
6.
13
2
23
.5
95
53
.9
32
T
Sd
0
0
1
1
0.
21
0.
21
0.
40
7
0.
40
7
1.
43
4
1.
43
4
0.
05
7
0.
05
7
IP
d
0
0
1
1
0.
26
0.
26
0.
43
8
0.
43
8
1.
10
7
1.
10
7
-0
.7
79
-0
.7
79
C
Pd
0
0
1
1
0.
14
0.
14
0.
34
8
0.
34
5
2.
07
8
2.
10
8
2.
32
9
2.
45
5
N
ot
e:
a c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 2
95
an
d 
28
2 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 fo
r t
he
 y
ea
r 2
00
2 
an
d 
20
05
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
re
 ar
e o
nl
y 
27
 an
d 
21
 co
m
pa
ni
es
 h
ol
d 
sh
ar
es
 >
 2
5%
 fo
r t
he
 y
ea
r 2
00
2 
an
d 
20
05
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
b 
co
m
pr
is
es
 o
f 3
04
 an
d 
34
2 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 fo
r t
he
 y
ea
r 2
00
2 
an
d 
20
05
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
re
 ar
e o
nl
y 
9 
an
d 
19
 co
m
pa
ni
es
 h
ol
d 
sh
ar
es
 >
 2
5%
 fo
r t
he
 y
ea
r 2
00
2 
an
d 
20
05
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
c c
om
pr
is
es
 o
f 3
18
 an
d 
32
6 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 fo
r t
he
 y
ea
r 2
00
2 
an
d 
20
05
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
re
 ar
e o
nl
y 
42
 an
d 
46
 co
m
pa
ni
es
 h
ol
d 
sh
ar
es
 >
 2
5%
 fo
r t
he
 y
ea
r 2
00
2 
an
d 
20
05
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
d 
de
no
te
s 
du
m
m
y 
va
ria
bl
e.
DIVIDENDS, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND BOARD GOVERNANCE ON FIRM VALUE
81
Table 3a: Results of hierarchical regression analyses examining the impact of dividends,
ownership structure and board governance on firm value for the year 2002
DV: Q-Ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.
Variables
(Constant) -11.661*** 0.993 -10.803*** 1.126 -10.573*** 1.152
LOGMCAP 2.426*** 0.185 2.236*** 0.203 2.266*** 0.209
AGE 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009
LEVERAGE 0.094 0.139 0.037 0.139 0.054 0.142
EPS -0.528 0.375 -0.404 0.376 -0.408 0.378
TS 0.008 0.272 0.103 0.271 0.106 0.275
IP 0.108 0.251 0.059 0.250 0.045 0.251
CP 0.452 0.307 0.432 0.306 0.446 0.308
DYLD 1.318*** 0.510 1.348*** 0.518
V1_CR5 -0.043 0.537 -0.093 0.541
V2_GOWN 0.019** 0.008 0.020** 0.009
V3_FOWN -0.020* 0.011 -0.019* 0.012
V4_MOWN 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.009
M1_DUALITY 0.031 0.216
M2_IND -0.082 0.124
M3_BSIZE -0.017 0.058
R2 0.324 0.348 0.350
Adjusted R2 0.312 0.328 0.325
? R2 0.324 0.025 0.002
F-Statistics 27.190*** 2.954** 0.362
Df 398, 7 393, 5 390, 3
Note:
The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
a denotes the proportion is less than 0.0001, the 0.000 is reported in the table.
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Table 3b: Results of hierarchical regression analyses examining the impact of
dividends, ownership structure and board governance on firm value for the year 2005
DV: Q-Ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.
Variables
(Constant) -30.963*** 3.383 -26.440*** 3.768 -26.663*** 3.868
LOGMCAP 6.526*** 0.634 5.775*** 0.692 5.737*** 0.710
AGE 0.005 0.033 -0.005 0.033 -0.013 0.035
LEVERAGE -2.699 1.913 -3.712** 1.872 -3.701** 1.887
EPS -0.983 1.570 -0.304 1.535 -0.333 1.540
TS -1.036 1.061 -1.016 1.034 -1.114 1.044
IP -1.039 0.974 -1.061 0.947 -1.077 0.949
CP 0.820 1.201 -0.083 1.187 -0.171 1.192
DYLD 4.141*** 0.801 4.137*** 0.802
V1_CR5 -0.266 2.129 -0.326 2.135
V2_GOWN -0.014 0.037 -0.013 0.037
V3_FOWN -0.047 0.039 -0.046 0.039
V4_MOWN -0.015 0.033 -0.015 0.033
M1_DUALITY -0.070 0.832
M2_IND 0.613 0.461
M3_BSIZE -0.155 0.217
R2 0.229 0.283 0.286
Adjusted R2 0.215 0.261 0.259
? R2 0.229 0.054 0.003
F-Statistics 16.866*** 5.936*** 0.592
Df 398, 7 393, 5 390, 3
Note:
The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
a denotes the proportion is less than 0.0001, the 0.000 is reported in the table.
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Table 4a: Results of moderated regression analyses between ownership structure and
dividends with board governance on firm value for the year 2002 (DV = Q-Ratio)
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2
Q-Ratio (Direct Effect) (Interaction Effect)
A B C
(Constant) -10.573*** -9.917*** -10.947*** -11.640***
Control variables:
.LOGMCAP 2.266*** 2.156*** 2.275*** 2.318***
AGE 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.007
LEVERAGE 0.054 -0.038 0.046 0.001
EPS -0.408 -0.390 -0.428 -0.477
TS 0.106 0.147 0.102
0.041
IP 0.045 0.047 0.036
0.032
CP 0.446 0.499* 0.472
0.479
Dividends:
DYLD 1.348*** 0.946* 0.206 -2.139
Ownership structure: -0.520 0.170 1.437
V1_CR5 -0.093 0.028*** 0.037 0.020
V2_GOWN 0.020** -0.018 0.006 0.063
V3_FOWN -0.019* 0.003 0.008 -0.013
V4_MOWN 0.003
Board governance:
M1_DUALITY 0.031 -0.459 0.032 0.022
M2_IND -0.082 -0.068 0.032 -0.086
M3_BSIZE -0.017 -0.011 -0.018 0.077
Interaction with Duality (M1):
DYLD X M1 6.545***
V1 X M1 0.837
V2 X M1 -0.067**
V3 X M1 0.015
V4 X M1 0.001
Interaction with Board Independence (M2):
DYLD X M2 0.386
V1 X M2 -0.089
V2 X M2 -0.005
V3 X M2 -0.008
V4 X M2 -0.002
Interaction with Board Size (M3):
DYLD X M3 0.353*
V1 X M3 -0.171
V2 X M3 0.000
V3 X M3 -0.009*
V4 X M3 0.002
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(Cont.) Table 4a: Results of moderated regression analyses between ownership
structure and dividends with board governance on firm value for the year 2002
(DV = Q-Ratio)
R2 0.350 0.382 0.353 0.360
Adjusted R2 0.325 0.350 0.319 0.327
? R2 0.350*** 0.032*** 0.003 0.011
F-Statistics 13.989*** 4.040*** 0.325 1.265
Df 390, 15 385, 5 385, 5 385, 5
Note:
The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
a denotes the proportion is less than 0.0001, the 0.000 is reported in the table.
Models 2A to 2C are those that incorporate interaction effects.
Table 4b: Results of moderated regression analyses between ownership structure and
dividends with board governance on firm value for the year 2005 (DV = Q-Ratio)
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2
Q-Ratio (Direct Effect) (Interaction Effect)
A B C
(Constant) -26.663*** -26.679*** -27.751*** -24.846***
Control variables:
LOGMCAP 5.737*** 5.956*** 6.283*** 6.048***
AGE -0.013 -0.010 -0.017 -0.005
LEVERAGE -3.701** -3.576* -2.322 -3.209*
EPS -0.333 -0.335 -0.671 -0.639
TS -1.114 -1.312 -1.077 -1.094
IP -1.077 -1.099 -1.355 -1.104
CP -0.171 -0.394 -0.605 -0.242
Dividends:
DYLD 4.137*** 4.265*** -18.270*** -19.332***
Ownership structure:
V1_CR5 -0.326 -1.825 -2.656 -5.424
V2_GOWN -0.013 -0.030 0.123 0.052
V3_FOWN -0.046 -0.064 -0.081 -0.006
V4_MOWN -0.015 -0.014 0.059 0.031
Board governance:
M1_DUALITY -0.070 -4.123 -0.153 0.017
M2_IND 0.613 0.583 0.215 0.617
M3_BSIZE -0.155 -0.163 -0.187 -0.631
Interaction with Duality (M1):
DYLD X M1 -4.655
V1 X M1 6.198
V2 X M1 0.147
V3 X M1 0.077
V4 X M1 0.004
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(Cont.) Table 4b: Results of moderated regression analyses between ownership
structure and dividends with board governance on firm value for the year 2005
(DV = Q-Ratio)
Interaction with Board Independence (M2):
DYLD X M2 6.213***
V1 X M2 0.728
V2 X M2 -0.049
V3 X M2 0.011
V4 X M2 -0.024
Interaction with Board Size (M3):
DYLD X M3 2.817***
V1 X M3 0.665
V2 X M3 -0.008
V3 X M3 -0.006
V4 X M3 -0.005
R2 0.286 0.295 0.326 0.318
Adjusted R2 0.259 0.258 0.291 0.283
? R2 0.286 0.009 0.040 0.032
F-Statistics 10.424*** 0.955 4.600*** 3.585***
Df 390, 15 385, 5 385, 5 385, 5
Note:
The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
a denotes the proportion is less than 0.0001, the 0.000 is reported in the table.
Models 2A to 2C are those that incorporate interaction effects.
Notes
1 Enron and WorldCom in U.S. have collapsed under massive restatement of their
financial statements. New York Times, “After 10 years, corporate oversight is still
dismal,” (January 26, 2003).
2 A notable corporate governance surveys, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Denis and
McConnell (2003), Farinha (2003a), and Mintz (2005). Also, see Claessens and Fan
(2002) for a survey on corporate governance in Asia.
3 The legislative response in the U.S. has been to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
in July 2002 to improve the quality, integrity and accuracy of the financial statement
of the corporation (Jain and Rezaee 2005).
4 McKinsey & Company (2002) suggest that “good” governance include the following
characteristics: (i) a majority of outside directors on the board; (ii) truly independent
outside directors with no ties with management; (iii) significant shareholdings by
directors; (iv) material proportion of directors’ pay being stock-related; (v) formal
directors’ evaluation in place; and (vi) high responsiveness to investors’ requests
on governance issues.
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5 Expropriation refers to behaviors through which controlling shareholders/
management transfer assets and profits from corporation to themselves at the expense
of minority shareholders. Another term used for expropriation is tunneling. Johnson
et al. (2000) and Mitton (2002) provide examples of tunneling in developed countries
and in Asian emerging economies.
6 This study limits tests to dividends since dividend are currently the dominant method
of distributing cash to investors in Malaysia, and also due to small sample data of
share repurchases because still not many firms in Malaysia exercise this method of
cash distributions.
7 See Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Claessens et al. 2000b; Claessens et al. 2000d; Claessens
& Fan 2002; Dhnadirek & Tang 2003; Denis & McConnell 2003; Lins 2003; Earle et al.
2005; Lskavyan & Spatareanu 2006; Selarka 2005; among others.
8 Investors Digest, February 2002.
9 Business Times, 11th Jan 2003.
10 Jayasankaran, S., “Turning back the clock,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 24th April
2003.
11 Government to issue RM 5.5 billion bonds to assume debt of LRT firm. http://
www.thestar.com.my, November 30th, 2001.
12 Malaysian Business, 1st July, 2003.
13 “The Potential of Valuecap” Business Week, The Star, 1st Feb 2003.
14 The Main Board companies have a minimum paid-up capital of Ringgit Malaysia
(RM) 60 millions while the Second Board companies are those that have a minimum
paid-up capital of RM40 millions. The sample does not consider the Second Board
firms listed on Bursa Malaysia due to their different paid-up capital and have different
listing requirements.
15 The government ownership is comprised of the companies whose shares held by
federal/state government investment agencies, federal/state government trust
agencies and federal pension funds; that include Khazanah Nasional Berhad (the
investment arm of the Ministry of Finance), Permodalan Nasional Berhad (manages
various national unit trusts), Employees Provident Funds (EPF), pilgrimage board
funds (Lembaga Tabung Haji), the military pension funds (Lembaga Tabung Angkatan
Tentera) etc.
16 See, for instance, Holderness et al. 1999; Booth et al. 2002; Hu and Kumar 2004;
Belden et al. 2005; Renneboog and Szilagyi 2006; Krivogorsky 2006; Gani and Jermias
2006.
17 See, McConnell and Servaes (1990); Morck et al. (1988); Short and Keasey (1999).
18 Other two alternative tests also can be used to detect multicollinearity. First, variance
inflation factor (VIFs) scores reveal no problems with multicollinearity if all scores are
less than 10 (Chatterjee & Price 1991). Second, by calculating the Condition Index
(Besley et al. 1980). If the Condition Index is less than 30, it indicates weak relations
among the independent variables (Besley et al. 1980). Therefore, it appears that
multicollinearity is not a problem. Results from the two tests are not reported in here.
19 According to Gujarati (2003), multicollinearity could be a problem when the correlation
exceeded 0.80. However, this study considers that multicollinearity problem exists
when the correlation exceeded 0.5.
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20 Normality tests based on skewness, kurtosis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S
test) are also conducted. However, the results are not reported here. The data is said
to be normal if the standard skewness is within ± 1.96 and standard kurtosis of ± 3.0.
Transformation technique for certain variables by using logarithm is also undertaken.
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